HERODOTUS

Book 1
Book 2
Book 3
Book 4
Book 5
Book 6
Book 7	1
Book 8	1,2,3
Book 9	1

BOOK 1

BOOK 2

BOOK 3

BOOK 4

BOOK 5

BOOK 6

BOOK 7

[1] When the news of the battle fought at Marathon reached King Darius the son of Hystaspes, although having previously been greatly exasperated at the Athenians on account of their attack upon Sardis, he then especially expressed far greater indignation, and was still more eager to march against Greece. And immediately he began issuing orders, sending messengers to the several cities, [for them] to prepare an army, imposing on each much more than they had furnished before, and ships, horses, corn and transports. When these orders were being proclaimed round about, Asia was thrown into commotion over a space of three years, the bravest men being enrolled and prepared for the purpose of making war against Greece. But in the fourth year the Egyptians, who had been subdued by Cambyses, revolted from the Persians; whereupon he only became more eager to march against both.

BOOK 8

[1] The Greeks who were assigned to the naval force were as follows: the Athenians on their part furnished 127 ships (although it was the Plateans who, from their courage and eagerness, in spite of their inexperience in seamanship, helped the Athenians in manning the ships); the Corinthians furnished 40 ships; the Chalcidians manned 20, the Athenians providing them with the ships; the Aeginetans, 18; the Sicyonians, 12; the Spartans, 10; the Epidaurians, 8; the Eretrians, 7; the Troezenians, 5; the Styreans, 2; and the Ceians, 2 ships and 2 penteconters. And the Opuntian Locrians came to their assistance with 7 penteconters.

[2] These then, were the forces which proceeded towards Artemisium, and I have also stated how great a number of ships each state contributed: the total number of ships assembled at Artemisium, besides the penteconters, was 271. The admiral with supreme power of command, Euribiades son of Euryclides, was provided by the Spartans. For the Allies had refused, if the Spartan did not command, to follow Athenian leaders, but said they would break up the intended expedition.

[3] For from the first, even before they sent to Sicily for the purpose of an alliance, there had been talk of the necessity of entrusting the fleet to the Athenians. But as the allies were against it, the Athenians yielded, deeming it a great matter that Greece should survive, and knowing that if they should quarrel about the command, Greece would be lost. And their thinking was right; for civil strife is as worse a thing than a war of common consent, as war is than peace. And so it was with a full understanding of this that they did not resist, but yielded, for as long as the Greeks needed them badly, as they plainly showed; for when, having repelled the Persian, they were now making a struggle over in his own country, they put forward as a pretext the insufferable behaviour of Pausanias as their excuse for depriving the Lacedaimonians of the command. But these things happened afterwards.

BOOK 9

[1] Mardonius, when Alexander upon his return had made known to him the answer from the Athenians, set out from Thessaly and started to lead his army in haste against Athens; and wherever he arrived from time to time, he would compel the people there to come over to his side. The leaders of Thessaly had not only repented nothing for their previous actions, but exerted themselves all the more to egg the Persian on; and Thorax of Larissa both joined in escorting Xerxes in his flight, and from then on openly allowed Mardonius to pass into Greece.