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[1] If some new subject for
debate were being proposed, men of Athens, I would have waited until most of
the regular speakers had declared their opinion; and then if anything that was
said by them was acceptable to me, I would have remained silent, and only if it
were not so, would I have tried to express my own view. But since it so happens
that we are now considering a question upon which they have spoken often
before, I imagine that, even though I rise first, I may reasonably win your
indulgence. For if they had given proper advice in time past, it would not be
necessary for you to be holding the current debate.
[2] Now in the first place,
Athenians, you must not be disheartened under your present circumstances, no –
not even if they appear to be in a most deplorable state. For that which is
worst in them as regards the past, is the best you have to rely upon with a
view to the future. What then is that? It is that your affairs are in such a
bad way precisely because you are doing nothing of what you should, since
surely if things were in the same [bad] way in spite of your accomplishing what
was required, there would not even be a hope that they would improve.
[1] Firstly, men of Athens, I
pray to the gods and goddesses one and all, that such a devotion as I have
constantly borne to the state and to all of you, may be made available to me on
your part for the present trial; secondly - and that which is most in the
interest of yourselves and of your religion and honour - I pray that the gods
may put this into your hearts, not to take my opponent as your adviser
concerning the manner in which you ought to hear me (that would be cruel
indeed!),
[2] but to take as your
adviser the laws and your oath, wherein, in addition to all the other just
provisions, also this prescription applies, namely, the case for hearing both
sides impartially. This means, not only not to prejudge in any point, nor only
to extend your goodwill equally to both, but to allow each of the opposing
orators to adopt both the order of argument and the line of defence, as each
has desired and preferred to do.
[3] Now while in many respects
I find myself at a disadvantage with Aeschines in this trial, there are two
disadvantages, men of Athens, which are particularly great. One, that I am not
contending for equal stakes; for it is not the same thing for me now to have to
forfeit your goodwill, as for my prosecutor not to win his case, but for me ...
I do not wish to say anything unpleasant at the beginning of my speech, whereas
it is from a position of advantage that my opponent is accusing me. The other
disadvantage, which is a natural disposition for all mankind, is to take
pleasure in listening to abuse and accusation, but to be annoyed with those who
praise themselves.
[4] Of these two positions,
that which makes for pleasure has been assigned to Aeschines, while that which
is offensive to almost everyone has been left to me. Now if on the one hand, in
precaution against this, I abstain from stating what has been accomplished by
myself, I shall appear to be incapable of clearing myself of the charges and of
showing on what grounds I claim to be worthy to be held in honour; but if, on
the other hand, I proceed to give an account of my achievements and my
political career, I shall be forced to speak frequently of myself. I will try
then to do so as fairly as possible; but whatever the case itself compels me
to, he who set such a trial on foot deserves to bear the blame for it.
[5] I think, men of Athens,
you would all agree that both I and Ctesiphon are parties to this proceeding,
and that for me it deserves an earnestness by no means inferior. For it is
painful and difficult to be deprived of anything whatever, especially if this
happens to one by the act of one’s enemy; but mostly [to be deprived of] the
goodwill and kindliness on your part, exactly in proportion as it is the
greatest [prize] to gain these things. This case being about such matters,
[6] I conjure and beg all of
you alike, while I am making my defence upon the charges, to hear me justly, as
the laws direct; which originally the lawgiver Solon, being well disposed
towards you and a friend to the people, thought it essential should be rendered
valid, not only by the fact of recording them, but also by the fact of [you]
the jurors having taken an oath:
[7] not that he distrusted
you, as it seemed to me, but seeing that it is not possible for the defendant
to circumvent the charges and the calumnies, wherein the prosecutor is strong
by being the first to speak, unless each of you jurors, observing his reverence
towards the gods, shall likewise admit favourably the just pleas of him who
speaks later, and having [first] devoted himself as a fair and impartial hearer
to both sides, shall thus make his decision upon the whole case.
[8] As I am about to render an
account today both for my entire private life, as it seems, as well as my
public measures, I wish once again to invoke the gods, and in your presence I
pray, first, that the same goodwill that I have always cherished for the city
and for all of you, may in equal measure be granted me for this trial; and
secondly, that they [i.e. the gods] will put it into all of your minds to give
that judgement that will be conducive both to your honour as a body and to your
respect as individuals.
[9] If then Aeschines had
brought an accusation only concerning his prosecution, I too should at once be
making my defence concerning the bill itself; but since he has wasted no less
argument in the discussion of other matters, and lied against me in most of
what he said, I think it both necessary and just, men of Athens, to speak
briefly about these things first, lest any of you be misled by extraneous
arguments to listen less favourably to my just pleas in respect of the
indictment.